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The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989: The Effect of the “SelfAffecting” Theory on Financial Institutions
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the government prosecuting someone for attempted
murder after that person failed to commit suicide. The defendant might
say that the government is converting a statute designed to shield
individuals from other’s criminal behavior into one that penalizes him
for conduct “affecting” himself.1 In response, the government, using
the attempted murder statute, argues that “affect” has long been
considered a reflexive verb that includes effects an individual may
produce on himself.2 Therefore, the government asserts that attempted
murder statute should extend to prosecuting failed suicides.
The illustration above may seem like an absurd hypothetical, but
the concept of the hypothetical has become a reality for JPMorgan,3
Citigroup,4 Bank of New York Mellon (“BNYM”),5 and Bank of
1. See Bank of New York Mellon’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 10, United States v. Bank of New York Mellon,
941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 6969 (LAK)) [hereinafter
BNYM’s Mem.] (claiming that the DOJ’s reading of FIRREA is contrary to its intended
purpose, which is to protect federally insured financial institutions from fraud by others).
2. See Memorandum of Law of the United States in Opposition to Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss at 17, United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 6969 (LAK)) (stating the word “affect” has long been
used to describe conduct that one may have upon oneself).
3. See Brian Collins, Why Suit Against JPM’s $13B Settlement Faces Uphill Battle,
AM. BANKER (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_34/why-suitagainst-jpms-13b-settlement-faces-uphill-battle-1065718-1.html (describing the settlement
reached between JPMorgan and the DOJ).
4. See Victoria Finkle & Joe Adler, Three Takeaways from Citi’s $7B Mortgage
BANKER
(July
14,
2014),
Settlement,
AM.
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_134/three-takeaways-from-citis-7b-mortgagesettlement-1068646-1.html (reporting that this settlement will allow the DOJ to set its sight
solely on Bank of America, the prominence of FIRREA, and the DOJ can still pursue
criminal charges against U.S. banks if FIRREA fails).
5. See Brent Ylvisaker, FIRREA Civil Money Penalties, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
(May 16, 2013), http://www.dorsey.com/eu_fsr_firrea_civil_money_penalties/ (describing
how the Self-Affecting Theory has allowed the DOJ to overcome Bank of New York
Mellon’s motion to dismiss).
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America.6 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has strong-armed these
financial institutions7 into massive settlements for engaging
in
fraudulent conduct that has “affected” the institution itself.8 The “SelfAffecting Theory,” proffered by the DOJ, allows a self-inflicted wound
to trigger civil penalties.9 The DOJ anchors the legality of the SelfAffecting Theory to section 951 of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”),10 which is
codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1833a.11 Section 1833a affords the
DOJ a ten-year statute of limitations to bring fourteen broad criminal
offenses, including mail and wire fraud, under a preponderance of the
evidence standard.12 When facing FIRREA penalties, financial
institutions have yet to succeed in getting cases dismissed.13
This Note addresses why the Self-Affecting Theory
misinterprets § 1833a. This Note argues that in cases where the DOJ
could bring, but is unwilling or unable to bring, criminal actions, a
federally insured financial institution should not be held civilly liable
under § 1833a for engaging in fraudulent conduct “affecting” that same
6. See Patricia Hurtado, Bank of America’s Countrywide Ordered to Pay $1.3 Billion,
BLOOMGBERG (July 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-30/bank-ofamerica-s-countrywide-ordered-to-pay-1-3-billion.html (describing how Bank of America,
as successor to Countrywide Financial Corp., has been ordered to pay nearly $1.3 billion in
FIRREA penalties); Ben Protess & Michael Corkery, Bank of America Offers U.S. Biggest
Settlement in History, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 6, 2014, 9:58 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/bank-of-america-nears-17-billion-settlement-overmortgages/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.html (describing the record settling settlement
between the DOJ and Bank of America).
7. For simplicity, in this Note a “financial institution” refers to all federally insured
depository institutions unless otherwise specified. A “financial institution” is defined in 18
U.S.C. § 20 (2012).
8. See BENTON CAMPBELL ET AL., LATHAM & WATKINS, CLIENT ALERT: EXPANDING
FIRREA LIABILITY FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DEVELOPMENTS
[UPDATE]
(Oct.
28,
2013),
available
at
http://www.lw.com/search?searchText=client+alert+1601 (discussing progression of the
Self-Affecting Theory through case law).
9. See Peter J. Henning, Judge’s Ruling Against Bank of America Showcases a Novel
Enforcement Strategy, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 4, 2014, 11:32 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/the-governments-big-stick/ (describing how the
DOJ has rediscovered FIRREA in order to assign liability to the events leading up to and
causing the 2008 financial crisis).
10. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
11. FIRREA § 951, 103 Stat. at 501 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1833a
(2012)).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1833a(c).
13. CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 8.
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institution.14 FIRREA does not define what it means to “affect[] a
Congressional intent
federally insured financial institution.”15
demonstrates that Congress enacted § 1833a in response to the
pervasive insider abuse and fraud of the savings and loan crisis (“S&L
Crisis”) and was not intended to punish financial institutions for losses
incurred from their own conduct.16 Under this perspective, the SelfAffecting Theory presents an impermissible reading of § 1833a.17
The analysis proceeds in five parts. Part II examines the
historical circumstances leading to the passage of FIRREA.18 Part III
explains FIRREA’s usefulness as a tool for the U.S. government.19 Part
IV describes the Self-Affecting Theory and how the courts and
government have addressed it.20 Part V addresses why the SelfAffecting Theory is inconsistent with the meaning of FIRREA.21 Part
VI concludes by proposing recommendations for financial institutions
to assess their exposure to potential FIRREA claims.22
II. INSIDER ABUSE AND FRAUD PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN CAUSING
THE S&L CRISIS
Congress enacted FIRREA in response to the S&L Crisis.23
14. See United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 443
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (addressing upon first impression whether a federally insured financial
institution may be civilly liable under § 1833a for conducting “affecting” that same
institution).
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a; see also Memorandum of Law of the United States in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 30, United States v. Countrywide Fin.
Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (Apr. 1, 2013) (No. 12 Civ. 1422 (JSR)) (Countrywide I)
(arguing that since FIRREA does not define what “affects” a financial institution, the court
should look to similar language in other provisions of § 1833a).
16. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 301 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86,
97; 136 CONG. REC. E2672-01, 1990 WL 111608, at 1 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of
the Hon. Nicholas Mavroules of Massachusetts) (“[T]he savings and loan scandal has
rapidly become a powerful example of flagrant abuse of trust and leadership. Financial
criminals must be brought to justice and their inequities should not be paid for by the
American people.”).
17. See BNYM’s Mem., supra note 1.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See infra Part VI.
23. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT FAILURES—COSTLY
FAILURES
RESULTED FROM REGULATORY VIOLATIONS AND UNSAFE PRACTICES 10 (1989) [hereinafter
1989 GAO REPORT] (reporting that serious misconduct by senior insiders or outsiders has
contributed to insolvencies of most banks, savings and loan, and credit unions).
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Although the S&L Crisis can be causally linked to a variety of factors,
insider abuse and fraud24 served as a major catalyst.25 Individuals like
Erwin Hansen,26 Don Dixon,27 and Charles Keating,28 defrauded their
financial institutions in order to achieve both institutional and personal
gain.29 Upon specific examination of twenty-six failed thrifts between
1985 and 1987, the Government Accounting Office (“GAO”)30 noted
that each of the failed thrifts involved individuals that engaged in
conduct constituting fraud and insider abuse.31 On an aggregate level,
serious insider misconduct contributed to the insolvencies of at least
75% of all failed institutions in the S&L Crisis.32 These failed
institutions often skirted regulatory supervision by engaging in “land
flips,” which involve two or more groups selling properties back and
forth in order to artificially inflate the face value of the real property.33
24. Insider abuse and fraud refers to a wide range of conduct by high-ranking
employees and directors of financial institutions, who committed unlawful acts with the
intent of personal gain without regard for the safety and soundness of the institution they
control. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1137, at 2 n.5 (1984) (defining fraud and insider abuse). For
example, insider abuse may include conduct such as high-risk and speculative ventures;
payment of dividends or bonuses at a time when the entity is close to or is insolvent; or
when the insider has breached fiduciary duties to customers. 1989 GAO REPORT, supra note
23, at 7– 9. Additionally, insider has been defined as a person who by virtue of their
position is able to influence the operations or decisions within a bank. OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN EVALUATION OF THE FACTORS
CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKS 33 (1988). Insider abuse includes legal
violations, but they are not a necessary element. Id. Furthermore, insider abuse may
include actions or failure to take action where the bank is harmed, takes on additional risk,
or loses an opportunity. Id.
25. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), supra note 16.
26. Erwin Hansen took over Centennial Savings and Loan, which collapsed in 1985 at
a cost to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation of an estimated $160 million.
See KITTY CALAVITA ET AL., BIG MONEY CRIME: FRAUD AND POLITICS IN THE SAVINGS AND
LOAN CRISIS 24 (1997).
27. Don Dixon operated Vernon Savings and Loan in Texas. When Vernon was taken
over in 1987, 96% of its loans were in default. The resolution of Vernon cost taxpayers $1.3
billion. See id. at 25.
28. Charles Keating purchased Lincoln Savings and Loan in 1984. After being shutdown in 1989, it cost more than $3 billion to resolve. See id. at 26–27.
29. See id. at 23 (describing the most notorious insiders from the S&L Crisis).
30. On July 7, 2004, the GAO’s legal name was changed from the Government
Accounting Office to the Government Accountability Office. See GAO Human Capital
Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811 (2004).
31. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT FAILURES: COSTLY FAILURES RESULTED
FROM REGULATORY VIOLATIONS AND UNSAFE PRACTICES 23 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 GAO
REPORT] (detailing the extent that fraud and insider abuse played in the S&L Crisis).
32. H.R. REP. NO. 101-982, at 5 (1990).
33. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-48, BANK AND THRIFT
CRIMINAL FRAUD: THE FEDERAL COMMITMENT COULD BE BROADENED 2 (1993) [hereinafter
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The end result of the practice typically benefitted insiders, senior
management, or other outside affiliates.34
Even though a lone fraudster may have significantly damaged
his respective financial institution through an isolated event, the
fraudulent conduct of failed institutions typically extended to senior
management.35 Inert boards of directors,36 usually dominated by one or
two individuals, bypassed internal controls and allowed their financial
institutions to pursue risky investments.37 Some financial institutions
pursued excessive loan growth with the view that the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) would insure their deposits
in the event borrowers could not repay the loans and the institutions
failed.38 The FSLIC had statutory authority to liquidate failed thrift
1993 GAO REPORT] (explaining that “land flips” were used in order to inflate the value of
real estate prices).
34. See 1989 GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 45–46 (detailing the Federal Housing
Loan Bank Board’s description of a typical conduct constituting insider abuse and fraud).
35. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1137, at 102 (1984) (stating that individual insider abuse and
fraud is typically representative of a larger scheme of insider abuse, self-dealing, and gross
mismanagement); Renae V. Stevens, Insider Abuse and Criminal Misconduct in Financial
Institutions: A Crisis, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 222, 227 (1999) (explaining that wellmanaged institutions that have strong internal controls usually continue successful operation
when facing economic downturn).
36. For simplicity, in this Note “directors” refers to an “institution-affiliated party”
within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(1) (2012), which is “any director, officer,
employee, or controlling stockholder (other than a bank holding company or savings and
loan holding company) of, or agent for, an insured depository institution.”
37. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN
EVALUATION OF THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKS 7 (1988)
(stating that management-driven weaknesses played a significant role in the decline of 90%
of the failed institutions examined); see also Fraud and Abuse by Insiders, Borrowers, &
Appraisers in the California Thrift Industry: Hearing Before The Commerce, Consumer,
and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 100th Cong. 122
(1987) (statement of Charles A. Deardorff, Deputy Director, Agency Group Federal Home
Loan Bank of San Francisco).
38.
See 1989 GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 17–18. The report offered the following
example of one S&L institutions’ excessive loan growth:
At one failed thrift, the president of the thrift initiated a construction
lending program in 1980 whereby the thrift provided 100 percent of the
financing in return for interest and a profit participation. The board of
directors did not give serious review or consideration to the amount of
capital involved or to the necessary staffing, record keeping, and
monitoring requirements prior to adopting the new lending program.
Moreover, without board oversight and control, the president and other
senior management simply operated the program as they wished.
Despite the fact that since 1982, examination reports pointed out
problems with the new lending program, the problems were not
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institutions and pay off insured accounts up to $100,000.39 By 1987,
however, the FSLIC had become insolvent and required a $10.825
billion recapitalization plan40 under the Competitive Equality Banking
Act of 1987 (“CEBA”).41 Unfortunately, CEBA insufficiently covered
the FSLIC losses when 535 banks and savings institutions failed in
1989,42 which prompted the enactment of FIRREA.43
In response to the fraud and abuse that contributed to the S&L
Crisis, Congress enacted FIRREA to strengthen criminal and civil
penalties for “defrauding or otherwise damaging financial institutions
and depositors.”44 FIRREA also sought to help depositors regain
confidence in the financial system by deterring fraudulent behavior by

corrected. In 1983, over $500 million (approximately 16% of the
thrift’s assets) had been committed to the program. The thrift’s board of
directors dismissed the president in 1984 but still made little progress in
correct the previously cited deficiencies. Bank Board documents noted
that, in the aggregate, ‘substantial losses’ were incurred as a result of the
lending program and additional losses were expected.
Id.
39. See Jeremy S. Westin, Contract Repudiation and Claim Determination Under FIRREA:
The Need for FDIC Restraint and Legislative Reform, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 557, 559
(1993) (describing the FSLIC’s authority to payoff insured accounts up to $100,000).
40. See Current Conditions in the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation:
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Budget, 100th Cong. 20 (1988) (statement of M. Danny
Wall, Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, accompanied by Larry White and Roger
Martin) [hereinafter Current Conditions].
41. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.). The purpose is “[t]o regulate nonbank
banks, impose a moratorium on certain securities and insurance activities by banks,
recapitalize the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, allow emergency
interstate bank acquisitions, streamline credit union operations, regulate consumer check
holds, and for other purposes.” Id.
42. Associated Press, Bank Failures Dip, For Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, at 42
(describing the total number of failed institutions in 1989 and comparing it to the number of
failed institutions in 1990).
43. See Remarks on Signing the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1226 (Aug. 9, 1989) (“This legislation [will] . . .
safeguard and stabilize America’s financial system . . . . And moreover, it says to tens of
millions of S&L depositors: You will not be the victim of others’ mistakes.”).
44. H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 305 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 101; see
also Mark David Wallace, Life in the Boardroom After FIRREA: A Revisionist Approach to
Corporate Governance in Insured Depository Institutions, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1187, 1189
(1992) (stating that after FIRREA was enacted, William Seidman, former Chairman of the
FDIC predicted there would be over 100,000 lawsuits attempting to place liability on
corporate officers and directors for the failure of individual thrift institutions).
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individuals and managers.45 Specifically, Congress viewed Title IX,
which includes § 1833a, as a necessary response to prevent insider
abuse and fraud from occurring in the future.46 After signing FIRREA
into law, President H. W. Bush stated “[b]eginning today, penalties for
wrongdoing by officers and directors of insured institutions will be
increased up to $1 million per day.”47
The prosecutions stemming from the S&L Crisis bolster the
view that FIRREA was enacted to deter individuals from damaging
financial institutions and their depositors.48 Between 1988 and 1992,
the DOJ charged and convicted over 2,500 financial institution fraud
offenders.49 A majority of the convictions rested on the individual
violating, or conspiring to violate, the predicate offenses listed under
§ 1833a(c).50 While the prosecution statistics fail to show any cases
involving a financial institution affecting itself, the statistics readily
demonstrate DOJ actions against individuals.51 For example, special
government task forces sentenced nearly 1,700 bank officials to prison
terms with a conviction rate of nearly 96%.52 In deciding whether to
45. See Current Conditions, supra note 40, at 24 (statement of M. Danny Wall, Chairman,
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, accompanied by Larry White and Roger Martin) (“A fact
of critical importance, sometimes overlooked in the kind of historical review I have just
outlined, is that it is the function of a system of deposit insurance to protect depositors, not
the management of thrift institutions and not the stockholders of thrifts that are structured as
stock associations.”).
46. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 23 n.17 (1993) (stating that the House of
Representatives report accompanying FIRREA demonstrates the belief that Title IX of
FIRREA was “absolutely essential to respond to serious epidemic of financial insider abuse
and criminal misconduct and to prevent its recurrence in the future”).
47. Remarks on Signing of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, supra note 43 (emphasis added).
48. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 104–05 (stating that the Special Counsel
appointed by President George H. W. Bush sought to “emphasize the need to proceed with
the coordinated two-pronged effort to put the crooks in jail and take their money back for
the public.”).
49. See id. at 76 (reporting that between October 1, 1988, and June 30, 1992, the DOJ
charged 3,270 defendants and convicted 2,603 defendants with a conviction rate close to 96
percent).
50. Compare id. at 14 (noting the commonly applied banking statutes in FIRREA
prosecutions) with 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c) (2012) (listing the predicate offenses for civil
liability).
51. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 69–84 (discussing the prosecution statistics for
financial institution fraud offenders).
52. See id. at 77–80 (listing examples of successful prosecutions against individuals and
their accompanying criminal and civil penalties); see also Gretchen Morgenson & Louise
Story, In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14prosecute.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
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prosecute, the DOJ considered numerous factors, such as “whether the
offense is part of a systemic problem; whether an insider (i.e., an
officer, director, or senior employee) committed the offense; whether
the applicable statute of limitations is about to expire; [and] whether
there is a reasonable, available alternative to criminal prosecution.”53 In
light of such considerations, the DOJ elected to prosecute individuals
and not financial institutions under § 1833a.54
III. THE BENEFITS OF FIRREA AS AN ENFORCEMENT TOOL
The DOJ has been aggressively using § 1833a in pursuing civil
liability against financial institutions in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis.55 Section 1833a permits the Attorney General, acting through the
DOJ, to initiate actions to recover monetary penalties against persons or
entities that have allegedly committed, or that have allegedly conspired
to commit, certain predicate criminal offenses.56 As of February 2015,
the financial institutions being prosecuted under § 1833a have failed in
their efforts to dismiss cases based on the argument that the SelfAffecting Theory is contrary to the literal reading of § 1833a.57 The
DOJ has proffered the Self-Affecting Theory under § 1833a because the
statute offers the following five advantages: (1) a preponderance of the
evidence standard; (2) fourteen predicate criminal offenses; (3) a tenyear statute of limitations; (4) the use of administrative subpoenas; and
(5) stiff penalties that apply to each violation.58

53.1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 20 n.15.
54. See id. at 77 (listing some of the major fraud cases that the DOJ has successfully
prosecuted, which only include individuals being prosecuted).
55. See Thomas P. Vartanian et al., Enforcement Actions Continue Three-Year Decline;
DOJ Emerges as Major Player, 102 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 947, 948 (May 20,
2014) (arguing that the DOJ has become a “de facto banking regulator” by using § 1833a).
56. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12
U.S.C. § 1833a (2012); see also Mary Gail Gearns, Legal Alert: Rakoff Decision Supports
Expanded Use of FIRREA as an Enforcement Tool, BINGHAM (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.bingham.com/Alerts/2013/08/Rakoff-Decision-Supports-Expanded-Use-ofFIRREA.
57. Erik Larson, BofA Must Face U.S. Suits Over Mortgage-Securities Fraud, BLOOMBERG
(June 20, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-20/bofa-must-face-u-s-suitover-mortgage-securities-fraud.html.
58. Reid J. Schar & Ramon Villalpando, Questions Abound over Scope of FIRREA Liability,
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2013, 12:52 PM),
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/12384/original/Schar_Villalpando_Law360.pdf
?1382982466.
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Preponderance of the Evidence Standard

Section 1833a is a hybrid statute that bases civil liability on the
DOJ’s ability to prove criminal violations under a preponderance of the
evidence standard.59 Since FIRREA actions are brought as civil
proceedings, § 1833a applies a preponderance of the evidence standard
to the enumerated fourteen predicate criminal offenses rather than the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.60 The lower burden of proof in
civil actions allows the DOJ to pursue enforcement for fraud that would
not ordinarily rise to the criminal standard.61 Thus, the DOJ will likely
choose to bring civil action when it does not have enough compelling
evidence to meet the criminal burden of proof.62
The DOJ initially brought, however, criminal fraud charges
against two senior managers at Bear Stearns in 2008.63 The DOJ
alleged that by 2007 the two managers were aware of investments on
the verge of collapse, and instead of warning investors about their
deteriorating condition, the managers misrepresented the funds in order
to limit investor withdrawals.64 Nevertheless, the fund collapsed in June
2007 and its investors lost $1.6 billion.65 The jury found reasonable
doubt on every charge and found the two managers not guilty of the

59. See Opinion and Order at 5, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12-CV-1422
(JSR), 2014 WL 3734122 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014) (Countrywide III).
60. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f) (“In a civil action to recover civil penalties under this section,
the Attorney General must establish the right to recovery by a preponderance of the
evidence.”); see also John R. Rowlett, The Chilling Effect of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 and the Bank Fraud Prosecution Act of
1990: Has Congress Gone Too Far?, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 239, 246 (1992) (predicting that the
DOJ will bring more claims under FIRREA because of the lower burden of proof).
61. See Andrew W. Schilling, Understanding FIRREA’s Reach: When Does Fraud ‘Affect’
a Financial Institution, 99 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 186, 186 (July 24, 2012)
(describing the various benefits of having a lower burden of proof in a civil trial).
62. See Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement Response to the
S&L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S155, S179 (1991) (stating that the civil proceeding in
such a case is basically a criminal proceeding without certain protections, such as the
presumption of innocence).
63. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Senior Managers of Failed Bear Stearns
Hedge Fund Indicted on Conspiracy and Fraud Charges (June 19, 2008),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2008/2008jun19.html.
64. See William D. Cohan, How the Scapegoats Escaped, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at
A35 (describing how the Bear Stearns case was tried).
65. See David Goldman, Former Bear Stearns Execs Not Guilty, CNNMONEY.COM (Nov.
11, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/10/news/companies/bear_stearns_case/ (detailing
the jury verdicts).
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alleged crime.66 The DOJ committed two errors in its prosecution.67
First, the prosecution used emails from the two managers’ accounts that,
when viewed holistically, were highly ambiguous as to proving
fraudulent intent.68 Second, the assistant U.S. attorney tried to
preemptively classify the defendants’ as deceitful Wall Street financiers,
and he openly accused them of lying in his opening statement.69 The
DOJ experienced that the criminal burden of proving fraudulent intent
would present a difficult task and that it might have to build a new
litigation strategy.70
Satisfying the burden of proof for criminal fraud charges proves
difficult partly because of the complicated nature of the transactions
underlying the 2008 financial crisis.71 To succeed in a criminal action,
the DOJ must usually prove specific intent as a necessary element and
have substantial evidence to reach the beyond a reasonable doubt
burden of proof.72 In United States v. Countrywide Financial Corp.,73
the DOJ alleged that Countrywide Financial Corporation74 had
perpetrated a scheme to defraud the Federal National Mortgage
Association (“Fannie Mae”)75 and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Group

66. Cohan, supra note 64 (quoting a juror who said, “We just didn’t feel that the case had
been proven”).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Amir Efrati & Peter Lattman, U.S. Loses Bear Fraud Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11,
2009, at A1 (explaining how the DOJ lost the Bear Stearns case and implications that it
might have in the future).
71. See Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, The ‘Civil-izing’ of White Collar Criminal
Enforcement, 249 N.Y. L.J. 1, 2–3 (May 7, 2013) (suggesting reasons why the DOJ has not
brought more criminal actions for conduct attributable to the 2008 financial crisis).
72. See 1989 GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 9.
73. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(Countrywide I).
74. Countrywide Financial Corporation includes Countrywide Bank, FSB and Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc. See Second Amended Complaint of the United States and Jury Trial
Demanded at 51–53, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 6, 2013) (No. 12 Civ. 1422 (JSR)) [hereinafter Countrywide Compl.]
75. Fannie Mae is “the leading source of residential mortgage credit in the U.S. secondary
market,” and is tasked with establishing industry standards, such as “manag[ing] credit risk,
build[ing] new infrastructure to ensure a liquid and efficient market, and facilitate[ing] the
collection and reporting of data for accurate financial reporting and improved risk
management.” Who Is Fannie Mae Today?, FANNIE MAE,
http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/about-us/company-overview/about-fm.html (last updated
Nov. 6, 2014).
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(“Freddie Mac”)76 in connection with Countrywide’s residential
mortgage lending business.77 Under the criminal burden of proof, the
DOJ would need to sufficiently allege factual circumstances that
specific individuals had knowingly intended to violate the criminal
offenses.78 Whereas the civil burden of proof allowed the DOJ to
simply prove that the existence of the fraudulent scheme was more
probable than its nonexistence.79 The DOJ prevailed on its civil claim.
Countrywide was found guilty after a jury trial, and Judge Jed S. Rakoff
ordered Countrywide to pay $1.2 billion in FIRREA penalties.80
B.

Fourteen Predicate Criminal Actions

In addition to the favorable burden of proof, FIRREA allows the
DOJ to prosecute an alleged violator under fourteen predicate criminal
actions.81 Section 1833a separates the fourteen criminal offenses into
two separate categories.82 The first category comprises nine of the
predicate offenses and deals specifically with banks and other financial
76. Freddie Mac ensures that “financial institutions have mortgage money to lend[,] make[s]
it easier for consumers to afford a decent house or apartment[, and] stabilize[s] residential
mortgage markets in times of financial crisis[.]” Our Business, FREDDIE MAC,
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/our_business/index.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2015).
77. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 2.
78. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1069, 1072 (1970) (affirming the New
York Court of Appeals’ observation that “ ‘a person accused of a crime . . . would be at a
severe disadvantage . . . if he could be adjudged guilty . . . on the strength of the same
evidence as would suffice in a criminal case’ ”); see also CHARLES DOYLE, MAIL AND WIRE
FRAUD: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 5 (2011) (stating for both mail fraud
and wire, “intent to defraud requires a willful act by the defendant with the intent to deceive
or cheat, usually for the purpose of getting financial gain for one’s self or causing financial
loss to another”) (citing United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Phipps, 595 F.3d 243, 245–46 (2010) (“Mail and wire fraud are both specific intent
crimes that require the Government to prove that a defendant knew the scheme involved
false representations.”); United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2009)).
79. Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-theEvidence Standard, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983).
80. See Opinion and Order at 19, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12-CV-1422
(JSR), 2014 WL 3734122 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014) (Countrywide III) (directing Bank of
America, which is Countrywide’s successor, to pay the nearly $1.3 billion FIRREA
penalty).
81. Joe Adler, DOJ to Continue Big-Bank Suits Despite B of A Decision, AM. BANKER (Apr.
3, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_65/doj-to-continue-big-bank-suitsdespite-b-of-a-decision-1066676-1.html (describing the broad charges that may be brought
against an alleged violator).
82. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
12 U.S.C. § 1833a(a)(c)(1)–(3) (2012).
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institutions.83 Under these offenses, the DOJ does not have to prove
anything beyond the offense itself.84 The second category, however,
contains the remaining five offenses, is broader in scope than the first
category, and the DOJ is required to prove that the offense “affect[ed] a
federally insured depository institution.”85 The mail fraud86 and wire
fraud87 statutes, which belong to the second category containing the
“affecting” language, are the most utilized by the DOJ due in large part
to their broad construction and interpretations.88
The DOJ has largely utilized the mail fraud89 and wire fraud90
offenses under § 1833a(c)(2) to trigger the Self-Affecting Theory.91 In
making out a prima facie case for mail or wire fraud, the prosecution
must show that the defendant (1) created a scheme to defraud, (2) for
purposes of obtaining money or property, and (3) used the mail or wires
in furtherance of that scheme.92 Additionally, the DOJ must present
proof that the defendant acted knowingly with “specific intent to
deceive or cheat, usually for the purpose of getting financial gain for
one’s self or causing financial loss to another.”93 The DOJ has
struggled with proving the requisite intent of the high-ranking officers
83. § 1833a(c)(1), (3).
84. See Edwin L. Fountain et al., FIRREA Civil Money Penalties: The Government’s
Rediscovered Weapon Against Financial Fraud, 36 SEC. REFORM ACT LITIG. REP. 9, 9
(2013) (discussing the predicate offenses under FIRREA and what are the proper pleading
requirements).
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
87. § 1343.
88. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint of the United States and Jury Trial Demanded ¶¶
182–85, United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
[hereinafter BNYM Compl.] (alleging that from 2000 through 2011, BNYM knowingly
executed a scheme and artifice to defraud, using interstate mail carriers and interstate wire,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343); Second Amended Complaint of the United
States and Jury Trial Demanded ¶¶ 167–73, United States v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 12 Civ.
7527 (JMF) (JFC) (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Wells Fargo Compl.] (alleging that Wells
Fargo submitted false certifications and false claims to HUD using the mails and wires in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, and 1343.”); Countrywide Compl., supra note 61, ¶¶ 218–
22 (alleging that from 2006 to 2010 Countrywide knowingly and fraudulently obtained
money from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac using interstate mail carriers and interstate wires,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
90. § 1343.
91. See documents cited supra note 88.
92. United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 461 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987); United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 409 (2d Cir. 1985)).
93. United States v. Moede, 48 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Sims,
895 F.2d 326, 329 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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for financial institutions because of the organizational culture and the
complexity of the transactions underlying the 2008 financial crisis.94
Under § 1833a, the DOJ has had considerable success charging
financial institutions under the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes.95
Mail fraud involves using the U.S. Postal Service or any private service,
such as FedEx or UPS, in an effort to obtain money or property in
furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.96 Likewise, wire fraud involves
using telecommunication systems, including the Internet and email, to
obtain money or property in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.97 The
DOJ has relied principally on these two statutes because they are
interpreted “to criminalize a wide range of conduct involving conflicts
of interests, alleged misrepresentations, [and] the failure of agents to
inform alleged principals of certain facts.”98 Moreover, the DOJ can
amass thousands of mail and wire fraud violations because each
separate use of the mail or wire connected to the fraudulent scheme
constitutes a separate offense.99 For instance, Countrywide was ordered
to pay nearly $1.3 billion for selling upwards of 7,600 defective loans—
each loan constituting a separate offense—transmitted via interstate
mail and wire carriers.100

94. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executiveprosecutions/ (suggesting why criminal prosecutions arising out of the 2008 financial crisis
have been absent).
95. See Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal ¶ 10, United States v. Citigroup,
Inc., No. 11 Civ. 5473 (VM) (Feb. 13, 2012); Settlement Agreement ¶ 11, United States v.
JPMorgan.
96. See United States v. Fox, 69 F.3d 15, 18–19 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence
demonstrating that an item had been mailed is sufficient to support the conviction for mail
fraud).
97. See United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 437 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that
defendant’s use of an internet connected program to process mortgage loan transactions
constituted wire fraud).
98. Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers:
Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 954 (1993).
99. See C.J. Williams, What is the Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 287,
287–88 (2014) (explaining how broadly the mail and wire fraud statutes may be construed).
100. Ben Protess & Michael Corkery, Bank of America Offers U.S. Biggest Settlement in
History, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 6, 2014, 4:27 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/bank-of-america-nears-17-billion-settlement-overmortgages/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
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Statute of Limitations

Not only are the underlying criminal offenses broad, § 1833a
also extends the statute of limitations.101 The civil actions cannot
commence more than ten years after the cause of action accrues,102
which is substantially longer than the typical three to five-year period
for civil fraud suits.103 For both mail and wire fraud, the criminal
statute of limitations is five years.104 Under the criminal statute of
limitations for mail and wire fraud, most of the actions contributing to
the 2008 financial crisis would have been precluded.105 However, under
§ 1833a, the extended period allows the DOJ to take its time and amass
as much evidence as possible before deciding whether to bring charges
against an individual or an institution.106
In October 2012, the DOJ alleged that Wells Fargo submitted
thousands of false loans to the Federal Housing Administration
(“FHA”) from 2001 through 2005 in violation of both mail and wire
fraud statutes.107 Typically, the seven-year lapse would bar the DOJ’s
101. See Adam S. Lurie et al., United States: FIRREA: Expect Substantial Anti-Fraud
Enforcement and Compliance Issues, MONDAQ (July 30, 2012),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/189330/FIRREA+Expect+Substantial+AntiFraud+E
nforcement+And+Compliance+Issues (describing the benefits that FIRREA gives to
prosecutors).
102. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12
U.S.C. § 1833a(h) (2012).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no
person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the
indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense
shall have been committed.”); § 3293(2) (“No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished
for a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate . . . section 1341 or 1343, if the offense affects a
financial institution . . . unless the indictment is returned or the information is filed within
10 years after the commission of the offense.”); see also JENNIFER R. ECKLUND, THE
EVOLVING DEFINITION OF MORTGAGE FRAUD: ANALYZING THE CHANGES IN INTERPRETATION
THROUGH COURT DECISIONS AND LEGISLATION SINCE THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS 2
(2014).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).
105. See ECKLUND, supra note 103. But see Will Congress Step in as a Threatening FIRREA
Storm Approaches?, THE STREET (Jan. 13, 2015, 8:33 AM),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/13008883/1/will-congress-step-in-as-a-threatening-firreastorm-approaches.html (stating that since FIRREA carries a ten-year statute of limitations,
“some actions could be brought through 2017”).
106. See Jay Williams et al., FIRREA: An Old Acronym is Turning into the Government’s
New Hammer on Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 129 BANKING L.J. 579, 581–82
(2012) (discussing the benefits the Government has in pursuing civil claims under
FIRREA).
107. Wells Fargo Compl., supra note 86, ¶ 47.

2015]

FIRREA & THE SELF-AFFECTING THEORY

277

action under similar mail and wire fraud statutes.108 Under FIRREA,
however, the statute of limitations is extended an additional five years
(totaling ten years), which permits the DOJ to collect all available
information to support the action before filing the FIRREA claim.109
D.

Administrative Subpoenas

The extended statute of limitations, coupled with the Attorney
General’s subpoena power, allows the DOJ to conduct extensive
discovery without ever filing suit.110 The Attorney General holds broad
power to issue administrative subpoenas “to summon witnesses and
require production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda,
or other records which the Attorney General deems relevant or material
to the inquiry.”111 While administrative subpoenas are not traditionally
used in criminal investigations, they allow the prosecutor to compel
testimony and production of documents in aid of the DOJ’s
performance of its duties.112 With this authority, the DOJ may issue an
administrative subpoena to any person believed to be in possession of
evidence.113 In contrast, judicial subpoenas require court approval
before records must be produced.114 Moreover, judicial subpoenas also
require a reason to believe that the evidence relates to a legitimate law
enforcement investigation.115 Thus, the use of administrative subpoenas
under FIRREA permits the DOJ to access vast amounts of information
in pretrial discovery without having to acquire court approval.116

108. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2012). But see § 3293 (extending statute of limitations except
for mail and wire fraud schemes that affect a financial institution).
109. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
12 U.S.C. § 1833a(h), (g) (2012).
110. Lurie, supra note 101.
111. § 1833a(g)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
112. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32880, ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS IN
CRIMINAL AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS 1–4 (2006).
113. Gregory A. Brower & Brett W. Johnson, What Corporate Counsel Should Know About
Inspector General Investigations, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., June 18, 2010, at 1, 1–4.
114. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 9-408, available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00408.htm.
115. 12 U.S.C. §3407(1) (2012).
116. See Williams, supra note 106, (describing the benefits the Government has in pursuing
civil claims under FIRREA); Andrew W. Schilling, U.S. Using Subpoenas Under 1989 Act
as New Tool to Probe Financial Firms, REUTERS: FIN. REG. F. (Jan. 3, 2013, 4:28 PM),
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2013/01/03/u-s-using-subpoenas-under1989-act-as-new-tool-to-probe-financial-firms/.
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Additionally, administrative subpoenas are rarely overturned.117
For example, the DOJ issued an administrative subpoena to Clayton
Holdings, LLC, for information relating to the “2008 collapse of the
housing market and economy in the United States.”118 Clayton
Holdings provided major due diligence information to Wall Street firms
that pooled mortgages into bonds, which were sold to investors.119
When Clayton Holdings challenged the relevancy of the administrative
subpoena, the U.S. District Court of Connecticut required that Clayton
Holdings turn over its emails, databases, and due diligence reports
concerning mortgage loans and mortgage pools from 2005 to 2007.120
The court noted that FIRREA’s administrative subpoenas aid in
determining whether any evidence exists.121 Therefore, the DOJ may
utilize administrative subpoenas to investigate with mere suspicion.122
E.

Large Monetary Penalties

Finally, the statute permits large monetary penalties against
violators.123 Although the civil penalties may generally not exceed $1
million,124 § 1833a has two exceptions that may increase the
penalties.125 First, in the case of a continuing violation, the civil penalty
117. See Andrew W. Schilling et al., Challenging FIRREA Subpoenas: The RMBS Working
Group Faces Subpoena Fight, 101 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 905, 906 (Dec. 3, 2013)
(stating that challenging a government subpoena does not justify the risk with the reward,
because the challenges are rarely successful and only anger the prosecutor).
118. Petition for Summary Enforcement of Administrative Subpoena ¶ 7, United States v.
Clayton Holdings, LLC, No.3:13-mc-00116-RNC (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2013).
119. See Tom Shoenberg, Clayton Should Give Mortgage Data to U.S., Says Judge,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-1111/clayton-should-give-mortgage-data-to-u-s-judge-says.html (describing the information
that the DOJ was seeking to recover).
120. See Recommended Ruling at 3–8, United States v. Clayton Holdings, LLC, No.
3:13mc116 (RNC) (D. Conn. Nov. 11, 2013).
121. See id. at 5–6.
122. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) (describing the
function of the administrative subpoena as “analogous to [that of] the Grand Jury, which
does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate
merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance
that it is not”).
123. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(1)–(3).
124. § 1833a(b)(1).
125. DOUGLAS W. BARUCH, FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP, FRAUD MAIL
ALERT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT BRANDISHES RARELY USED WEAPON—FIRREA—IN FULLSCALE ASSAULT ON S&P, AND CALIFORNIA JOINS THE BATTLE WITH SEPARATE STATE FALSE

2015]

FIRREA & THE SELF-AFFECTING THEORY

279

may be increased to $5 million.126 Second, “if any person derives
pecuniary gain from the violation, or if the violation results in pecuniary
loss to a person other than the violator,” the civil penalty can be
increased to the amount of such gain or loss.127
Under both of these exceptions, the DOJ has sought increased
penalties in bank prosecutions for alleged mortgage fraud.128 In
settlement agreements resulting from § 1833a actions, defendants made
substantial payments.129 As of February 2015, Bank of America has
received the highest FIRREA civil penalty of
$5
billion.130
Furthermore, since most of the DOJ’s FIRREA cases have ended in
settlements, it is hard to determine if the penalties were based on
detailed calculations or a negotiated settlement.131 Nonetheless, the
DOJ reached these record-setting penalties because of the amount of
available information in pretrial discovery that may be applied to broad
criminal offenses under a lower burden of proof.132
In Countrywide,133 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York gave a detailed calculation as to how it
reached the $1.2 billion FIRREA penalty.134 The court based the
penalty on Countrywide’s fraudulent scheme that induced Fannie Mae

CLAIMS ACT COMPLAINT (Feb. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/Final%20%202.11.2013%20%20FraudMail%20%20Justice%20Department%20Brandishes%20Rarel
y%20Used%20Weapon.pdf (describing how the penalties are statutorily applied).
126. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(2) (“In the case of a continuing violation, the amount of the
civil penalty may exceed the amount described in paragraph (1) but may not exceed the
lesser of $1,000,000 per day or $5,000,000.”).
127. § 1833a(b)(3).
128. See ALLYSON B. BAKER & ANDREW OLMEM, VENABLE, LLP, FIRREA: THE DOJ’S
EXPANSIVE (AND EXPENSIVE) TOOL OF CHOICE 1 (Oct. 9, 2013).
129. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 2, United States v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 5473
(VM) (July 15, 2014) (applying a $4 billion FIRREA penalty); Settlement Agreement at 3,
United States v. JPMorgan, No. 13 Civ. 0220 (JPO) (Nov. 19, 2013) (applying a $2 billion
FIRREA penalty).
130. See Settlement Agreement at 5, United States v. Bank of America Corp, No. 13 Civ.
446 (MOC) (M.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 2014) (applying a $5 billion FIRREA penalty).
131. Michael Ide, Bank of America And DOJ: What Can We Learn From JPMorgan’s
Experience, VALUEWALK (Apr. 28, 2014, 9:21 AM),
http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/04/bank-of-america-doj-jpmorgan/ (internal quotation
marks omitted).
132. Villalpando, supra note 58.
133. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(Countrywide I).
134. Opinion and Order at 10–15, 19, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12-CV1422 (JSR), 2014 WL 3734122 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014) (Countrywide III).
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and Freddie Mac to purchase risky mortgages originating from the
“High Speed Swim Lane” (“HSSL”) program.135 In calculating the
damages, the court determined that the HSSL program started on
August 13, 2007, and ended on May 22, 2008.136 During that roughly
nine-month period, a total of 28,882 loans, valued at $4.8 billion, were
sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.137 Of the 28,882 loans, the HSSL
program initiated 17,611 defective loans, comprising 61% of the total
loans sold.138 The court valued each loan at the price Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac paid to Countrywide for the defective loan and determined
that the upper-limit of the penalty equaled 61% of the total amount paid,
which equaled $2.9 billion.139 Of the 17,611 defective HSSL loans,
57% percent proved not to be materially defective, and the total
damages were reduced by 43% to $1.2 billion.140
IV. THE DOJ AND THE CASE LAW BOLSTERING THE SELF-AFFECTING
THEORY
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the DOJ has actively
pursued charges against financial institutions for the pervasive mortgage
and financial fraud that occured prior to the crisis.141 In response,
President Barack Obama created the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
Force (“Fraud Task Force”) with the primary purpose to hold
accountable and assign liability to those responsible for the 2008
After failed criminal prosecutions, the U.S.
financial crisis.142
135. Id.
136. Id. at 7–8.
137. Id. at 14 n.10.
138. Id. at 9.
139. Id. at 14 n.10.
140. Id. at 15.
141. ECKLUND, supra note 103, at 9.
142. Executive Order 13519, Establishment of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
Force, Nov. 17, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executiveorder-financial-fraud-enforcement-task-force (stating the intent of the FFETF is “to
investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes and other violations relating to the
current financial crisis and economic recovery efforts, recover the proceeds of such crimes
and violations, and ensure just and effective punishment of those who perpetrate financial
crimes and violations . . . ”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bank of America
to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading
up to and During the Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bankamerica-pay-1665-billion-historic-justice-department-settlement-financial-fraud-leading
(stating that post-settlement with Bank of America, the Fraud Task Force has recovered
$36.65 billion to date for American consumers and investors).
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Attorneys Office rediscovered FIRREA and began to use § 1833a.143
Section 1833a is a “hybrid statute predicating civil liability on the
[DOJ] proving criminal violations . . . by a preponderance of the
evidence standard.”144 Under § 1833a, the DOJ has advanced the SelfAffecting Theory in a wide array of contexts, such as FHA loan
origination and servicing,145 loan sales to Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac,146 and foreign exchange practices.147
The Self-Affecting Theory allows the DOJ to sue a financial
institution when it has committed one or more of the five enumerated
offenses that “affect[] a federally insured financial institution.”148 The
five predicate offenses are: (1) false claims made to the officers or
agencies of the United States;149 (2) false statements or entries made to
the U.S. government;150 (3) attempts to conceal assets or property from
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;151 (4) use of interstate mail
carriers in a scheme to defraud;152 and (5) use of electronic, radio, or
television communications in a scheme to defraud.153 The DOJ has
largely utilized the mail fraud and wire fraud offenses to trigger the
Self-Affecting Theory.154
Section 1883a, however, does not define what constitutes

143. Schilling, supra note 61, at 186.
144. Opinion and Order at 5, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12-CV-1422
(JSR), 2014 WL 3734122 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014) (Countrywide III).
145. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 593, 629–33 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
146. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605–06 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
147. United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444, 463 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (holding that “BNYM has been charged with participating in a fraudulent scheme and
harming itself in the process. . . . [BNYM’s] motion to dismiss on this ground is denied in
full.”).
148. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12
U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2) (2012); Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (“[S]ince
Bank of America is itself a federally insured financial institution, its wrongful conduct (and
the conduct of Countrywide imputed to it) ‘affected’ a federally insured financial institution.
(The parties refer to this as the ‘self-affecting’ theory).”).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012).
150. § 1001(a)(1)–(3).
151. § 1032(1).
152. § 1341.
153. § 1343.
154. See Wells Fargo Compl., supra note 88, ¶¶ 167–73; Countrywide Compl., supra note
74, ¶¶ 182–86; BNYM Compl., supra note 88, ¶¶ 182–185.
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“affecting a federally insured financial institution.”155 Yet courts have
interpreted this language in § 1833a by applying the dictionary
definition of “affect,” meaning “ ‘to act upon’ as in ‘to produce an
effect . . . upon,’ ‘to produce a material influence upon or alteration in,’
or possible ‘to have a detrimental influence on.’ ”156 Some courts assert
that a financial institution is “affected” by its own conduct whenever its
participation harms itself irrespective of whether it participated in its
own fraudulent scheme.157 Accordingly, in holding that the SelfAffecting Theory allows the financial institution to be both the victim
and perpetrator,158 courts have relied on the canons of statutory
interpretation and case law interpreting a similar provision, 18 U.S.C. §
3293(2),159 under FIRREA.160
A.

Courts and DOJ Constructions of § 1833a

In United States v. Bank of New York Mellon,161 the DOJ
brought a FIRREA civil fraud action alleging that from 2000 to 2011
BNYM defrauded its custodial clients who used BNYM’s standing
instruction foreign exchange service.162 Under the standing instruction
service, BNYM would complete foreign exchange transactions on an as
needed basis, and BNYM would determine the price of the currency the
custodial client received.163 The DOJ alleged that BNYM, using
interstate mail and wire carriers, selected the worst possible exchange
rates for its clients and that BNYM profited from these trades because it
155. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12
U.S.C. § 1833(a)(c)(2) (2012).
156. United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 35 (1993)); see also United
States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F.Suppp.2d 598, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Countrywide
I) (holding that in this context “affect” has the same meaning as the dictionary definition).
157. See Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
158. See id. at 451 (holding that defendants’ argument that affecting is synonymous with
victimizing and that the harm needs to come from a third person is not persuasive).
159. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 961(l), 103 Stat. 183, 501 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
3293(2) (2012)).
160. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 593, 630 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (rejecting Wells Fargo’s defense to the Self-Affecting Theory on the grounds that the
text support a reading of the Self-Affecting Theory and that § 3293(2) contains nearly the
same language).
161. 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
162. BNYM Compl., supra note 88, ¶ 1.
163. Id. ¶¶ 26–38.

2015]

FIRREA & THE SELF-AFFECTING THEORY

283

received the difference between the actual rate and the rate it charged its
clients.164 The DOJ proffered the Self-Affecting Theory by arguing that
BNYM, as a federally insured financial institution, had affected itself
because the fraudulent scheme had exposed it to significant risk of legal
exposure.165 In response, BNYM argued that § 1833a imposes penalties
“if any person derives pecuniary gain from the violation,”166 which,
under a natural reading, would distinguish the person potentially subject
to the penalties from the federally insured financial institution that was
the target of the violation.167
BNYM’s argument against the Self-Affecting Theory was not
persuasive to Judge Lewis A. Kaplan.168 The initial provision of §
1833a provides that “[w]hoever violates any provision of law to which
this section is made applicable by subsection (c) of this section shall be
subject to a civil penalty in an amount assessed by the court in a civil
action under this section.”169 The term “whoever” applies to
“corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies,
and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”170 Courts have
further determined that “whoever” should be “ ‘construed liberally.’ ”171
When read in conjunction with “affecting a federally insured financial
institution,”172 the term “whoever” would permit any federally insured
financial institution that has committed one of the five predicate
offenses to be liable for harming itself.173
Judge Kaplan also found the Self-Affecting Theory to constitute
a valid reading within the statutory structure of § 1833a(c)(2).174

164. Id. ¶¶ 175–77.
165. Id.
166. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12
U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
167. § 1833a(c)(2); BNYM Mem., supra note 1, at 11.
168. See United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 461 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
169. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(a); see also Memorandum of Law of the United States in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss at 14, supra note 2 (“If Congress had
intended to exempt federally insured financial institutions from civil penalties under
FIRREA when they engage in fraudulent conduct ‘affecting’ themselves, it could have
easily done so. Instead, it used the broad language ‘[w]hoever.’ ” ).
170. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
171. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 461 (quoting United States v. A&P
Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 123 n.2 (1958)).
172. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2).
173. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 452.
174. Id. at 463.
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Neither § 1833a(c)(1)175 nor (3)176 contains the “affecting a federally
insured financial institution” language found in § 1833a(c)(2),177 which
necessitates that the violation or conspiracy violate a predicate offense
“affecting a federally insured financial institution.”178 In resolving the
discrepancy, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York concluded that the limiting language was not added to require the
offense be directed at the financial institution; rather, “affecting” is
synonymous with “involving”179 and, therefore, “being in the financial
industry.”180 Thus, according to the court, § 1833a(c)(2) should be read
to encompass all conduct involving the entire financial industry,
including how a financial institution’s conduct may affect itself.181
B.

Courts and DOJ Interpretation of § 3293(2)

In United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,182 the DOJ brought
a FIRREA civil fraud action alleging that Wells Fargo’s residential
mortgage lending business defrauded the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”) from May 2001 through October 2005,
which resulted in the FHA paying $190 million on defaulted
mortgages.183 When a borrower defaults on a residential mortgage
175. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(1) (listing the following predicate offenses under Title 18 of
the United States Code: 215, 656, 657, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014 or 1344).
176. § 1833a(c)(3) (listing a violation of conspiracy to violate 15 U.S.C. § 645(a) as a
predicate offense).
177. § 1833a(c) (“This section applies to a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate section
287, 1001, 1032, 1341 or 1343 of Title 18 affecting a federally insured financial
institution . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (describing the use of
“the Postal Service, or . . . private or commercial interstate carrier” for the purpose of
executing, or attempting to execute, “[a] scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (describing the use of “wire . . . in interstate or foreign
commerce” for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, “[a] scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises . . .”).
178. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2).
179. The Southern District of New York found this comparison between affecting and
involving relevant because of the heading for Subtitle E of Title IX of FIRREA, which is the
section containing § 1833a. Subtitle E was entitled, “Civil Penalties for Violations
Involving Financial Institutions.” United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp.
2d 438, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
180. Id. at 454.
181. Id. at 453.
182. 972 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
183. See Wells Fargo Compl., supra note 88, ¶ 136.
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insured by the FHA, HUD pays the lender the balance of the loan and
HUD assumes ownership of the foreclosed property.184 Since the FHA
and HUD are federal agencies and not federally insured financial
institutions, the DOJ alleged that Wells Fargo’s fraudulent conduct, as a
federally insured financial institution, “has affected the bank by
exposing it to actual losses and increased risk of loss[,]”185 which
included exposure to civil liabilities under the False Claims Act alleged
in the same complaint.186
In denying Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss, Judge Jesse
Furman relied on other courts interpreting § 3293(2),187 which is a
similar provision in FIRREA that contains nearly identical language as
§ 1833a.188 Section 3293(2) extends the statute of limitations for mail
fraud189 and wire fraud190 from five years to ten years “if the offense
affects a financial institution.”191 Courts previously interpreting §
3293(2) held that to trigger the “affecting” language, the DOJ only
needs to allege facts that would demonstrate an institution’s exposure to
an increased risk of loss due to its conduct.192 Applying that same
reasoning, the U.S. District Court for Southern District of New York
found that the DOJ had sufficiently alleged two increased risks of loss
that had resulted because of Wells Fargo’s allegedly fraudulent
scheme.193 First, Wells Fargo’s fraudulent underwriting practices
resulted in FHA-insured loans that would likely default, and
consequently, the FHA had to indemnify HUD against those defaulted
loans.194 Second, Wells Fargo’s fraudulent practices have exposed it to
“significant legal expenditures.”195
Similarly, in Countrywide,196 the DOJ initiated a FIRREA civil
184. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 593, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
185. See Wells Fargo Compl., supra note 88, ¶ 170.
186. Id. at 47.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 3292(2) (2012).
188. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
190. § 1343.
191. § 3292(2).
192. United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 694–95 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273, 1278–79 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bank of New York
Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 457–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
193. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
194. Id. at 630–31.
195. Id. at 631.
196. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(Countrywide I).
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fraud suit arising from an alleged scheme to defraud Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.197 Under § 1833a, the DOJ sought to recover civil
penalties for violations of mail fraud198 and wire fraud199 that “affect[ed]
federally insured financial institutions.”200 The DOJ alleged that in
2007, Countrywide’s residential mortgage lending business instituted a
loan origination model, known as HSSL,201 which increased the rate at
which it originated and sold loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
while eliminating underwriting and compliance supervision.202 The
DOJ, using the Self-Affecting Theory, alleged that the affected federally
insured financial institutions were Countrywide and Bank of America,
because both entities have “directly or indirectly paid billions to settle
repurchase demands.”203 After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor
of the DOJ on October 23, 2013,204 and Judge Jed Rakoff ordered
Countrywide to pay $1.2 billion in FIRREA penalties.205
Judge Rakoff upheld the Self-Affecting Theory based on
Countrywide having to settle repurchase claims to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac resulting from the fraudulent HSSL scheme.206 Moreover,
Judge Rakoff stated that since Countrywide committed mail and wire
fraud, the court was able to rule that “such ‘self-inflicting’ effects were
not only sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that a federally
insured entity be affected, but also were here sufficient to warrant being
found by the [c]ourt as a matter of law.”207 Further, Judge Rakoff
reasoned that the threat of criminal liability alone is enough to affect the
federally insured financial institution, which is enough to satisfy
FIRREA.208 Citing Judge Furman’s interpretation of § 3293(2) in Wells

197. Countrywide Compl., supra note 74, at 2.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
199. § 1343.
200. Countrywide Compl., supra note 74, at 10.
201. Id. at 3.
202. Id. at 3–5.
203. Id. at 39–40.
204. See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 8 (discussing progression of the Self-Affecting
Theory through case law).
205. See Opinion and Order at 15, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12-CV1422 (JSR), 2014 WL 3734122 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014) (Countrywide III).
206. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(Countrywide I).
207. See United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 996 F. Supp. 2d 247, 249 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (Countrywide II).
208. Id. at 249–50.
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Fargo Bank,209 Judge Rakoff agreed that the DOJ “need not allege
actual harm, but only facts that would demonstrate that the bank
suffered an increase risk of loss due to its own conduct.”210
V. THE SELF-AFFECTING THEORY IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The Self-Affecting Theory is inconsistent with FIRREA’S
legislative purpose because Congress intended to give the DOJ a tool
for protecting financial institutions from individuals seeking personal
gain at their institution’s expense.211 Prosecutions arising out of the
S&L Crisis were conducted with that purpose in mind.212 However, in
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis the DOJ has used § 1833a to
assign liability to an unintended class of perpetrators, going beyond the
congressional intent.213 The DOJ has erroneously applied the SelfAffecting Theory to recover damages and force settlements from the
nation’s largest financial institutions for two reasons.214 First, courts
have applied the case law of § 3293(2) without fully examining its
limitations.215 Second, the DOJ has circumvented FIRREA’s legislative
intent by shifting its policy from protecting banks from fraudulent third
parties to prosecuting banks for internal fraudulent activities.216
A.

The DOJ’s Application of § 3293(2) to Its Interpretation of §
1833a
The DOJ has utilized holdings from cases interpreting § 3293(2)

209. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
210. Countrywide Fin. Corp. 996 F. Supp. 2d at 250 (Countrywide II).
211. William F. Johnson, Mortgage Lending Enforcement Invokes Old Tool With New
Theories, 249 N.Y. L.J., Jan. 3, 2013, at 1, 2 (discussing FIRREA’s intended purpose and
how it has been used for something entirely different).
212. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 76 (listing examples and statistics of
prosecutions arising out of the S&L Crisis).
213. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 15–17, United States v.
Countrywide, 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
214. See Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 71, at 1–2.
215. See Final Form Superseding Consolidated Brief for Defendant-Appellant Gary Heinz at
30, United States v. Heinz, No. 13-3119, 2014 WL 7232369 (Dec. 17, 2014) (arguing on
appeal that 18 U.S.C. § 3293(2) (2012) should not apply where the financial institution has
settled previous cases).
216. See Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 71, at 2.
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without addressing § 3293(2)’s intended purpose.217 That section and
its limiting language were not meant to harm financial institutions.218
Rather, the purpose of § 3293(2) served “to protect financial
institutions, a goal it tries to accomplish in large part by deterring
would-be criminals from including financial institutions in their
schemes.”219 FIRREA sought to protect the depositors and federal
taxpayers from the fraudulent behavior that caused the S&L Crisis.220
Therefore, the DOJ has bolstered the Self-Affecting Theory by taking a
seemingly analogous provision out of its contextual boundaries and
applying it contrary to congressional intent.221
In addition, the DOJ does not address other case law that
developed limitations on when a financial institution has been affected
within § 3293(2).222 The Fourth Circuit has held that “mere utilization”
of a financial institution in a fraudulent scheme is not by itself sufficient
to trigger the “affecting” language.223 There needs to be evidence of
some impact on the financial institution.224 The alleged fraud needs to

217. Memorandum of Law of the United States in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 30–32, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (listing all of the rules derived from courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3293(2) without
ever stating the legislative intent).
218. See Alyssa King, The Protection of Deposits and Depositors: A Limited Interpretation
of 12 U.S.C. § 1833a, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 759, 782–83 (2014) (describing prior case law
that limits § 1833a(c)(2)).
219. United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 2003).
220. See United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 455 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (“In fact, the legislative history shows who Congress truly believe were the victims of
the S&L Crisis and whom Congress sought to protect through FIRREA: S & L depositors
and federal taxpayers put at risk by the thrifts’ fraudulent behavior.”); see also
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 6, United States v. Countrywide Fin.
Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
221. See Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss the
First Amended Complaint at 18, United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d
593 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
222. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9–11, United States v. Countrywide
Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Countrywide I).
223. United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The district court
correctly concluded during Ubakanma’s sentencing hearing that a wire fraud offense under
section 1343 ‘affected’ a financial institution only if the institution itself were victimized by
the fraud, as opposed to the scheme’s mere utilization of the financial institution in the
transfer of funds.”).
224. United States v. Agnes, 214 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Pelullo,
964 F.2d 193, 216 (3rd Cir. 1992)) (“The court in Pelullo recognized that . . . the effect on
the bank would be too attenuated to invoke the statute in certain circumstances, for example,
‘if the fraud was directed against a customer of the depository institution which was then
prejudiced in its dealings with the institution.’ ”).
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evidence a “sufficiently direct” result on the financial institution to
trigger the extended statute of limitations.225 Moreover, the alleged
fraud must proximately cause the harm or risk of harm, which
necessarily includes reasonable foreseeability.226 A well-recognized
canon of statutory construction provides that punitive statutes must be
narrowly construed.227 Therefore, allowing settlements and related legal
costs would be too attenuated to demonstrate an effect.228 Thus, it
would be too remote to hold a financial institution liable for harm it
might suffer by enacting the allegedly fraudulent schemes.229
Similarly, allowing the DOJ to proceed after only demonstrating
a new or increased risk of loss in pursuing FIRREA penalties is
contradictive to the congressional intent of § 1833a.230 Congress passed
§ 1833a in direct response to the insider abuse and fraud that catalyzed
the S&L Crisis.231 Congress did not contemplate that FIRREA would
be used to prosecute a financial institution for conduct affecting itself.232
225. See United States v. Rubin/Chambers, Dunhill Ins. Servs., 831 F. Supp. 2d 779, 783
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing United States v. Bouyea, 152 F.3d 192, 195 (2nd Cir. 1998)); see
also Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 459 (“[T]he Court is mindful that effects
must be ‘sufficiently direct’ and that ‘there maybe some point where the influence a
defendant’s wire fraud has on a financial institution becomes so attenuated, so remote, so
indirect . . . that it does not in any meaningful sense affect the institution.’ ” (internal
citations omitted)); Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9, United States v.
Countrywide, 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
226. See Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 460.
227. See United States v. Vanoosterhout, 898 F. Supp. 25, 30 (D.D.C. 1995).
228. See King, supra note 218, at 786.
229. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9, United States v. Countrywide
Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing the DOJ’s alternative theory of
liability, the “derivative affects” theory, which would consider financial institutions to be
affected under the mail and wire fraud statutes solely by their investment in another entity
that was the direct object of the alleged fraud); Final Form Superseding Consolidated Brief
for Defendant-Appellant Peter Ghavami at 29, United States v. Heinz, No. 13-3119, 2014
WL 7232371 (Dec. 17, 2014) (arguing that the plain language, legislative history, and
purpose of § 3293(2) demonstrate that “settlement agreements reached by a culpable bank
are not the type of harm contemplated by the statute”).
230. See Bank of New York Mellon’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 10–11, United States v. Bank of New York
Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
231. See 1989 GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 10 (“Serious misconduct by senior insiders or
outsiders (i) has caused, has contributed to, or was present in the insolvencies of most banks,
savings and loan (S&Ls), and credit unions, and (ii) also caused large losses in unhealthy
and healthy institutions during the period 1984 through the first half of 1987.” (citations
omitted)).
232. See Christopher Matthews, Federal Prosecutors Emerge From Mortgage-Fraud Trial
With New Weapon, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2013, 6:39 PM)
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304069604579154033805282804
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Likewise, case law interpreting similar “affecting” language has not
held that a financial institution “can be penalized on the basis that its
fraud against a third party affected a financial institution by virtue of its
own investment in that third party.”233 In effect, the DOJ has taken §
1833a beyond its intended boundaries of prosecuting individuals by
applying it to prosecuting financial institutions.234
B.

The DOJ’s Prosecutions Under § 1833a

The prosecutions stemming from the S&L Crisis bolster the
view that FIRREA was enacted to deter individuals from damaging
financial institutions and their depositors.235 Between 1988 and 1992,
the DOJ charged and convicted over 2,500 individual defendants.236 A
majority of the convictions rested on the individual violating or
conspiring to violate the predicate offenses listed under § 1833a(c).237
While the prosecution statistics fail to show any cases involving a
financial institution affecting itself, the statistics readily demonstrate
DOJ actions against individuals.238 For example, special government
task forces sentenced nearly 800 bank officials to prison terms with a
conviction rate of nearly 96%.239 Therefore, prosecuting a financial
institution under § 1833a appears contradictory to how the DOJ

(quoting Steve Bartlett, a former Republican congressman from Texas, who co-sponsored
FIRREA, as saying that the Justice Department’s new use of FIRREA strays from the law’s
intent and that “he never recalled discussing the possibility that the law could be used this
way as it was drafted and ultimately passed through Congress”).
233. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9, United States v. Countrywide Fin.
Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Countrywide I).
234. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 104–05 (stating that the Special Counsel
appointed by President George H. W. Bush sought to “emphasize the need to proceed with
the coordinated two-pronged effort to put the crooks in jail and take their money back for
the public”).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 76 (“Between October 1, 1988, and June 30, 1992, Justice charged 3,270
defendants through indictments and information[] and convicted 2,603 defendants (110
defendants were acquitted, establishing a conviction rate near 96 percent).”).
237. Compare id. at 14 (noting the commonly applied banking statutes in FIRREA
prosecutions) with Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c) (2012) (listing the predicate offenses for civil liability).
238. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 69–84 (discussing the prosecution statistics
for financial institution fraud offenders).
239. See id. at 77–80 (listing examples of successful prosecutions against individuals and
their accompanying criminal and civil penalties); see also Morgenson & Story, supra note
52.
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originally employed FIRREA regarding the S&L Crisis.240
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the Fraud Task Force
has pursued primarily civil enforcement and regulatory action as
opposed to criminal convictions.241 In its “First Year Report” published
in 2011, the Fraud Task Force vaguely listed its prosecution statistics
under Operation Stolen Dreams, but it did not specifically state the
violations leading to the prosecutions.242 Three years later, it has
become apparent that the DOJ has increasingly resorted to pursuing
civil actions under FIRREA to sanction alleged corporate misconduct
resulting from the 2008 financial crisis.243 The likely reasons for the
shift from criminal to civil liability are twofold: first, the DOJ has
geared its prosecution policy towards charging organizations;244 and
second, the complexity of the financial instruments and transactions
underlying the financial crisis make proving criminal culpability
difficult.245
The 2008 DOJ revisions—also referred to as the Filip
Memorandum, to the United States Attorneys’ Manual, which is binding
on all federal prosecutors—altered how federal prosecutors investigate
and prosecute corporate crimes.246 Specifically, the Filip Memorandum
added a provision allowing federal prosecutors to determine whether or
not to pursue non-criminal alternatives.247 In evaluating the adequacy
of the non-criminal alternatives (civil or regulatory enforcement
actions), the federal prosecutor has broad discretion and may even
240. See Matthews, supra note 232 (stating that when FIRREA was used previously, it was
employed against individuals whose frauds harmed the financial institution).
241. See Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 71, at 2.
242. See FIN. FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, FIRST YEAR REPORT, at 4.8–4.9 (2011)
(separating and listing the number of criminal and civil enforcement actions under
Operation Stolen Dreams while not detailing what offenses the violators committed).
243. See Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 71.
244. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS, §§ 9-28.100–.1300 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2008/08/28/corp-chargingguidelines.pdf.
245. Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 71.
246. ALAN I. RAYLESBER, CHADBOURNE & PARK LLP, CLIENT ALERT: DOJ REVISES
GUIDELINES TO LIMIT DEMANDS THAT CORPORATIONS WAIVE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
OR NOT ADVANCE EMPLOYEE’S LEGAL FEES AS A CONDITION OF ‘COOPERATING’ WITH A
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION (Sept. 8, 2008),
http://www.chadbourne.com/clientalerts/2008/dojrevises/.
247. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.1100 (Other Civil
or Regulatory Alternatives) (Aug. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.1100.
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consider “the likelihood that an effective sanction will be imposed.”248
Considering this discretion in light of either the lack of enough evidence
to surpass the criminal burden of proof249 or the belief that criminal
prosecutions may have a negative effect on the economy,250 the DOJ has
authority to pursue financial institutions in civil actions.
In addition to the DOJ policy favoring civil action, the complex
circumstances giving rise to the 2008 financial crisis and the
institutional structure of the financial institutions make criminal
prosecutions unappealing.251 Although evidence of insider abuse and
fraud exists, the pervasiveness of such conduct cannot be singled out
with enough certainty to meet the criminal standard.252 The
organizational culture allows for responsibility to be dispersed among
high-ranking employees, which portrays any misconduct as
symptomatic of the entire organization.253 Prior to the recent crisis,
most institutions incentivized its participants in fraudulent schemes by
offering larger salary bonuses for increased loan volume.254 This
248. Id. § 9-28.1100(A)(2).
249. See Frontline Interview with Lanny Breuer, Lanny Breuer: Financial Fraud Has Not
Gone Unpunished, FRONTLINE (Jan. 22, 2013, 9:42 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financialcrisis/untouchables/lanny-breuer-financial-fraud-has-not-gone-unpunished/ (“With respect
to Wall Street cases, we looked at those as hard as we looked at any others, and when a case
could be brought, we did. But when we cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there
was criminal intent, then we have a constitutional duty not to bring those cases.”).
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created an adversarial system within the organization that condoned
misconduct and deterred reporting such conduct.255 A study released in
2013 noted that 26% of the survey respondents with ten years or less
experience in the financial industry believed that they have to engage in
misconduct to get ahead.256 Even though evidence of misconduct exists
in these institutions,257 the pervasiveness of such conduct cannot be
singled out with enough certainty to reach the criminal level.258
Moreover, when dealing with large financial institutions,
especially in the subprime mortgage lending arena, the ability to
pinpoint individual culpability becomes even more opaque.259 In the
subprime mortgage market, depository institutions would initially use a
mortgage broker, who acted as a middleman between the lender and
borrower, to issue newly formed mortgages.260 The
depository
institution would then sell the mortgage to investment banks that pooled
together various mortgages, estimated future cash flows, and then
converted the cash flows into bonds secured by the compiled
mortgages.261 The investment bank would then sell the bonds to buyers,
who purchased shares and became the owners of the mortgage-backed
securities.262 The subprime mortgage market invoked participation of
countless individuals, which makes demonstrating the requisite
fraudulent intent for criminal liability difficult.263 Thus, the DOJ, in

255. See LABATON SUCHAROW, WALL STREET IN CRISIS: A PERFECT STORM LOOMING 1
(2013), available at
http://www.secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/LiteratureRetrieve.aspx?ID=182189&A=Search
Result&SearchID=4865706&ObjectID=182189&ObjectType=6 (reporting that most Wall
Street employees feel that they must engage in misconduct in order to get ahead).
256. Id. at 3.
257. Morgenson, supra note 252.
258. Breslow, supra note 252.
259. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 90–92 (Jan.
2011) (discussing the various models employed and roles played by subprime mortgage
lenders prior to the 2008 financial crisis); see also See Who Is Too Big To Fail: Are Large
Financial Institutions Immune From Personal Prosecution? Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 113th Cong. 6–7
(2013) (statement of Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General) [hereinafter
Raman Hearing].
260. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage
Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1090 (2014).
261. Id. at 1090–91.
262. Id.
263. Don Mayer et al., Crime and Punishment (or the Lack Thereof) for Financial Fraud in
the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Reasons and Remedies for Legal and Ethical Lapses, 51
AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 542 (2014).
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seeking to assign liability from the 2008 financial crisis, has opted to
look at criminal conduct as a general, civil matter within a financial
institution.264
Although the DOJ may have authority to pursue civil actions
against financial institutions, it does not necessarily make it desirable.265
In determining the applicability of § 1833a, the statute’s “wording
against the background of its legislative history and in the light of the
general objectives Congress sought to achieve” must be considered.266
In § 1833a, Congress illustrated a clear intent to deter fraudulent
conduct by individuals.267 By applying the Self-Affecting Theory,
however, the DOJ has disregarded the legislative intent and instead
proffered a literal interpretation of § 1833a that is contrary to
congressional intent.268
264. Raman Hearing, supra note 259.
265. See GEORGE COSTELLO & YULE KIM, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 3 (2008) (stating that the statute may derive meaning from
the “definition of terms, by the statute’s statement of findings and purposes, by the
directive’s relationship to other specific directives . . . and by the statute’s overall structure.
Courts also look to the broader context of the body of law into which the enactment fits”).
266. Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968).
267. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 300 (1989). The report described the losses arising
from the S&L Crisis had a general pattern:
While the majority of thrifts are run by honest and dedicated
management, it is clear that fraud and insider abuse has been a major
factor in a significant portion of thrift failures in the 1980’s. Many
fraud cases involving FSLIC’s largest losses have borne an uncanny
resemblance. The general pattern has been a state chartered institution
that underwent a change of control during the early 1980’s. These
institutions participated in rapid growth schemes and adopted risky
investment
strategies.
Poor
management
techniques
and
unresponsiveness to regulatory appeals for change are also a hallmark of
these institutions; so are high levels of compensation and extravagant
expenditures. Regulators estimate that as many as 40% of thrift failures
are due to some form of fraud or insider abuse.
Id.
268. See LEGISLATIVE INTENT SERVICE, INC., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT AS AIDES TO
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN FEDERAL COURT 3 (citing O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S.
79 (1996); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987); FDIC v.
Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476, U.S. 426, 432 (1986); Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 746
n.15, 748 n.18 (1985); Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 222–32, 222 n.20
(1981); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 201 (1979); Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 469 (1975); United House Found. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.
457 (1892) (“The literal interpretation of words of an act should not prevail if it creates a
result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislator and if the words are sufficiently
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VI. CONCLUSION
FIRREA intended to assign liability to individuals who were
responsible for causing the S&L Crisis.269 The 2008 financial crisis,
however, presented a new set of circumstances that involved complex
transactions within large financial institutions.270 When trying to assign
individual criminal culpability, it is not surprising that the DOJ
struggled with overcoming the criminal burden of proving “whether or
not the entity or person acted willfully, that is, with an intent to violate
the law.”271 The DOJ experienced this difficulty first hand when the
jury returned the not guilty verdicts for the two Bear Stearns senior
managers.272 In attempting to assign culpability, the DOJ has
improvised new ways to assign liability.273 The DOJ has used the SelfAffecting Theory to hold three of the nation’s largest financial
institutions civilly liable for criminal misconduct.274
The Self-Affecting Theory, however, is not within the scope and
legislative intent of Congress.275 Congress passed FIRREA with the
intention that it would be used to help banks, not hurt them.276 Thus,
the DOJ has used FIRREA for a contrary purpose as it continues to
assign liability to the very financial institutions it was ordered to
protect.277
Since the Self-Affecting Theory has yet to be overturned, the
DOJ will likely continue to pursue FIRREA claims against large
flexible to allow construction which will effectuate the legislative intention.”).
269. Stanley I. Langbein, The Thrift Crisis and the Constitution, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
159, 193 (1996).
270. See Jake Zamansky, Five Years After Lehman, It’s Business as Usual on Wall Street,
FORBES (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jakezamansky/2013/09/12/five-yearsafter-lehman-its-business-as-usual-on-wall-street/.
271. Raman Hearing, supra note 259.
272. Cohan, supra note 64.
273. John A. Nathanson & Casey O’Neill, Fewer Corporate Prosecutions: A More Effective
Approach, LAW360 (Feb. 14, 2012, 1:50 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/308990/fewer-corporate-prosecutions-a-more-effectiveapproach.
274. See Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal ¶ 10, United States. v.
Citigroup, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 5473 (VM) (Feb. 13, 2012); Settlement Agreement ¶ 11, United
States v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 13 Civ. 0220 (JPC) (Feb. 4, 2014).
275. Villalpando, supra note 58.
276. See Matthews, supra note 232 (describing that one co-sponsor of the 1989 law said the
Justice Department’s new use of FIRREA strays from the law’s intent).
277. Remarks on Signing the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989, supra note 43.

296

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 19

national institutions and even smaller, more regional banks.278 Thus,
FIRREA is at least relevant to all financial institutions.279 Financial
institutions may evaluate their exposure to potential FIRREA claims in
a number of ways.280 They may perform audits of Suspicious Activity
Reports filed within the previous ten years to assess potential FIRREA
claims and determine whether any self-reporting measures can be taken
to limit exposure.281 Additionally, financial institutions should attempt
to deal with whistleblower complaints internally, especially since most
whistleblowers report their concerns internally before reporting to the
government.282 Under FIRREA, a whistleblower is entitled to “20
percent to 30 percent of any recovery up to the first $1,000,000
recovered, 10 percent to 20 percent of the next $4,000,000 recovered,
and 5 percent to 10 percent of the next $5,000,000 recovered,”283 for a
maximum total reward of $1.6 million.284 Regardless of whether or not
the $1.6 million is likely to incentivize a high-ranking employee to risk
his or her lucrative career,285 whistleblowers play key roles in
developing strong cases against financial institutions, such as the role
Edward O’Donnell played in Countrywide.286
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